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ABSTRACT

Larsen, Vance J. M.S., Purdue University, May 2016. Responsible Microfinance
Bundling: Experimental Evidence on Separating Insurance and Credit Offers. Major
Professor: Dr. Jonathan Bauchet.
In recent years combining multiple financial products into one package in a process
known as bundling has become more common among microfinance institutions (MFIs).
While bundling can be beneficial to MFIs by cutting costs and providing protection from
client default, the implications for MFI customers are less clear. Bundling the products
may take advantage of the existing relationship between the financial institution and the
client to expand microinsurance access and take-up, but alternatively offering too many
products could lead to low client understanding and thus low take-up of the product.
We conducted a randomized field experiment to determine if separating the offer of crop
insurance from the loan application would result in increased rates of take-up, coverage
amounts and understanding amongst potential clients in Colombia. Individuals in the
control group received a voluntary, bundled credit/insurance offer at the time they were
applying for a loan, while individuals in the treatment group received a separated offer
for the same insurance product several weeks after the loan application process was
complete. Separating the insurance offer did not have a statistically significant effect on
take-up rates, coverage amounts or product understanding. These findings suggest that
the voluntary bundling of microfinance products is a valid approach to expanding
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outreach and increasing financial access that benefits both providers and clients.
Measures of product understanding are low, however, in both the bundled and separate
offer groups, which indicates a need for responsible bundling with strong consumer
protection.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Risk management is critical to the livelihood of many households in developing
countries, who face large and varied risks. Yet poor households are often inadequately
protected against these risks, despite the myriad of informal and formal tools and
strategies that they rely on (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009). Formal
insurance products can contribute to improving poor families’ risk management
outcomes, particularly microinsurance products, specifically designed for and targeted to
poor individuals in developing countries through low premiums, low coverage amounts,
and simplified terms. Emerging microinsurance products include life insurance, creditlife insurance, health insurance, as well as rainfall insurance and other broader types of
crop coverage. While the widespread availability of microinsurance products has
increased over the last decade, take-up remains low (Cole et al., 2013; Eling, Pradhan, &
Schmit, 2014). Many factors contribute to low take-up rates, including lack of trust in the
insurance provider (H. Cai, Chen, Fang, & Zhou, 2015; Cole, 2015) and lack of
familiarity with the concept of insurance or the specific product (Cole et al., 2013; Eling
et al., 2014).
One approach to increasing take-up is to distribute microinsurance through MFIs, often
by bundling insurance products with loans. The bundling can either be mandatory,
meaning clients must accept either all products in the bundle or none of them, or
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voluntary, when clients can choose which specific product(s) in a menu of available
options they wish to take-up. Bundling insurance with loans presents several advantages.
It builds upon an MFI’s existing branch network and their relationship with the target
population, allowing for higher outreach at lower distribution costs, and taking advantage
of the trust that many clients have in their microfinance lender. It also helps MFIs
manage their own risk by decreasing the likelihood that a client will default as a result of
a dramatic event such as illness, death, accident, or crop loss (Ananth, 2005).
Mandatory bundling of microfinance products, however, also has important drawbacks.
Requiring clients to purchase insurance bundled with loans has been shown to decrease
loan take-up, reducing overall access to financial services (Banerjee, Duflo, & Hornbeck,
2014; Giné & Yang, 2009). Bundling may also affect clients’ ability to process and retain
information about insurance, a new and complex financial product, at a time when they
are preoccupied with their loan application. Living in poverty has been shown to reduce
individuals’ ability to process and retain information, which Mullainathan and Shafir
(2013) have labeled the “scarcity mindset,” increasing the likelihood that individuals
experience “information overload” (Eppler & Mengis, 2004) when faced with arduous
decisions, such as judging the value of a bundle of complex financial products.
The existing literature, however, has only considered the effect of mandatory bundling of
loans and insurance product(s). It does not address how offering insurance bundled with
loans on a voluntary basis affects client ability to evaluate an insurance product and
willingness to accept it. In addition, the mechanisms by which bundling leads to higher or
lower take-up have not been explicitly explored. This paper contributes to the literature
by addressing these issues. It asks: is bundling voluntary insurance products with loans an
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effective and responsible strategy to increase take-up of insurance? The potential effects
of bundling a voluntary insurance product with loans are ambiguous. On one hand, taking
advantage of the point of contact between a financial institution and an individual
interested in signing up for financial products could provide a unique and cost-effective
way to expand microinsurance take-up and help individuals protect themselves from risks
with formal financial products. On the other hand, offering too many products
simultaneously in a bundle could lead to cognitive overload, low understanding of
insurance, and therefore low adoption.
We test the effect of separating a bundled, voluntary microinsurance product with credit
on insurance take-up, insurance coverage amount and understanding by randomly
varying the time when a crop insurance product was offered to Colombian farmers
applying for microcredit loans to support their agricultural activities. Additionally, we
examine if those who have a greater understanding of the product are more likely to
purchase. The insurance is designed to protect smallholder farmers against major natural
disasters, such as flooding, drought, landslides, or frost. It is underwritten by a
commercial insurer, subsidized by the government, and distributed through an MFI
serving households in rural, mountainous areas of Colombia. Individuals applying for a
loan from the institution between March and October 2015 were assigned to be offered
crop insurance at the time of the loan application, in a voluntary bundled package (our
control group), or several weeks later after their loan had been processed (our treatment
group). We operationalized the treatment as a time-separated offer of the same insurance
product to a statistically-similar sample of loan applicants (through the randomization),
by the same sales agent (the loan officer), instead of opting for a completely independent
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sales process in order to specifically capture the effect of bundling or separating the two
offers, keeping all else equal as much as possible.
We find that separating the offer of insurance did not improve any of the outcomes that
we measured. The take-up rate was relatively high overall (22.8 percent) but was not
statistically significantly different in the bundled and separated groups (24.5 percent and
20.9 percent, respectively). Similarly, the amount of coverage purchased by individuals
in the bundled group ($1,487) was higher than those in the separate group ($951), but
again the result was not statistically significantly different.
Finally, we do not find support for the hypothesis that bundling insurance with loans
leads to cognitive overload and lower levels of understanding of the product. Overall,
measures of understanding indicate that many clients in both the treatment and control
groups do not recall important aspects of the insurance offer, the perils covered, or even
whether or not they have insurance coverage. Surveyed individuals were incorrect 38
percent of the time when asked if the insurance was required to obtain a loan, were wrong
30 percent of the time when asked whether or not they had purchased the product, and
were wrong 69 percent of the time regarding what perils the insurance product protects
against. We find evidence that individuals who correctly answered survey questions
regarding their insurance status and the perils covered by the product had higher take-up
rates. However, we do not find this same association between knowing the product was
voluntary and take-up rates.
Individuals in the treatment (separated) group did not exhibit a better understanding of
the insurance product than their counterparts in the bundled group, and clients reported
perceiving clearly the voluntary nature of the crop insurance. On the contrary, our results
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suggest that individuals in the separate sale group were more likely to answer questions
about the product incorrectly than individuals in the bundled group (36 percent of the
former did, versus 25 percent of the latter, but the difference is not statistically
significant).
Taken together, these results indicate that voluntary bundling of insurance products with
loans is a valid approach to offering microinsurance. Low overall levels of understanding
and recall of insurance product characteristics, however, highlight a critical need for
strong consumer protection, whether bundled or separate sales approaches are used.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

2.1

Microinsurance Demand and Bundling

Farmers around the world face enormous and varied risks, and there is strong evidence
that these risks have immense welfare effects and constrain the investment that
individuals make in their farms, suggesting great potential value for agricultural
insurance products (Hill, Magnoni, & Zimmerman, 2014). Initially when launched, MFIs
attempted to improve the financial lives of poor households by offer lending services, but
increasingly they are extending their outreach to beyond credit, by offering
microinsurance (Khavul, 2010) as well as other products and services. However, demand
for formal insurance products remains low (Cole et al., 2013; Eling et al., 2014; Giné,
Townsend, & Vickery, 2008; Thornton et al., 2010). In a study piloting weather based
index insurance in Ethiopia, on average about ten percent of potential clients purchased
the product (Hill & Robles, 2010). Even where extensive subsidies and other costly
efforts are made to increase demand, take-up typically remains low. Cole et al. (2013)
studied take-up of a weather index insurance product in India, and found that even with
high subsidies and customized educational and marketing interventions, take-up was
around 28 percent. Households that were not exposed to these interventions designed to
increase demand had take-up rates near zero.
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As mentioned previously, two barriers to microinsurance take-up are lack of trust in the
provider and unfamiliarity with the product, or insurance in general. Cole et al. (2013)
conclude that several determinants in addition to price, such as trust and familiarity, are
important in determining whether or not a potential client will purchase. Giné et al.
(2008) found that lack of product understanding was the most commonly given
explanation by households in their decision not to purchase insurance. Both Cole (2015)
and H. Cai et al. (2015) highlight the important role that trust plays in an individual’s
decision about whether or not to purchase a microinsurance product.
Two other main determinants that prior research has found to drive the demand for
microinsurance are premium prices (Cole et al., 2013; Dercon, Gunning, Zeitlin, Cerrone,
& Lombardin, 2012; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & Udry, 2012) and liquidity constraints
(Cole et al., 2013). Karlan et al. (2012) find that price is a consistent driver of the demand
for rainfall index insurance in northern Ghana, while Dercon et al. (2012) use a
randomized field experiment in Kenya and determined that market demand was sensitive
to discounts in price, but not to financial literacy, specifically risk literacy. Additionally,
Cole et al. (2013) finds that both price and liquidity play an important role in the
insurance purchase decision, using findings from a series of field experiments in rural
India.
One potential solution that has been put forth to increase take-up of microinsurance
products is the process known as bundling. In bundling, multiple financial products are
combined and offered at the same time to the same client, by the same institution.
Bundling can be mandatory, in cases when clients must purchase the entirety of the
bundled package to have access to the benefits of all the products and cannot opt out of
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any singular piece of the bundle without losing access to all benefits, or voluntary, when
clients and potential clients are offered multiple financial products at the same time but
access to any component of the bundle is not contingent on the decision regarding the
other product(s). Our study examines a situation of voluntary bundling, where individuals
are offered, but not required to purchase, a crop microinsurance product when they apply
for a loan from an MFI in Colombia.
Although the premium price for both the treatment and control groups in our research are
the same, the situation regarding paying for the insurance is different for the two groups.
Individuals in the bundled (control) group can finance their premiums with their loan, and
make payments on a monthly basis, whereas separate (treatment) group individuals must
pay up front for the insurance. It is unknown what effect if any, this difference has on
take-up rates and coverage amounts.

2.2

Client Understanding

While past research suggests mixed results of how understanding interacts with the
decision to purchase microinsurance, it does little to inform us if individuals in the
control or treatment group of our research design would be expected to have greater
understanding of the product. We examine various efforts to increase understanding of
microfinance products and also review the broader literature on decision making in the
context of poverty to develop a hypothesis regarding the following question: which group
of individuals will display greater product knowledge as measured by responses to the
survey?
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Of particular relevance from the consumer perspective is client understanding of the
products offered and how that understanding influences purchase decisions. Lack of
sufficient understanding is sometimes cited by potential clients as a reason for not buying
insurance (Giné & Yang, 2009; Takahashi, Ikegami, Sheahan, & Barrett, 2016).
Additionally, Takahashi et al. (2016) find that learning kits including comics, skit tapes,
and other tools contributed to better knowledge of livestock insurance, but this
knowledge did not significantly increase take-up. Understanding of a product may also
lead to higher renewal rates, as it helps to avoid disappointment with the product
(Platteau & Ontiveros, 2013). However, some studies conclude that providing more
information about microinsurance products does not directly increase take-up, even if it
produces greater client knowledge of the product (Cole et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2013).
Research has been conducted to determine if broader financial education, in contrast to
information specific to the particular insurance product, can be effective in stimulating
microinsurance demand. J. Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2011) find that participation in a
financial education session increased take-up of a weather insurance product. Gaurav,
Cole, and Tobacman (2011) find that a short insurance education module did not increase
take-up, but a two-day educational program, involving games that simulate rainfall
insurance, increased insurance demand by five percentage points.
We turn to the literature about decision making in the context of poverty to ascertain
whether individuals in the control or treatment group would be expected to have greater
understanding of the product. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) discuss how scarcity of
both time and money reduce an individual’s mental bandwidth and force them to focus on
the present, leaving little space for long term planning and decision-making. While
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bundling the microinsurance product with a loan application may have benefits for both
MFIs and consumers in terms of cost of delivery and subsequently pricing, one
consequence of the bundled scenario is that the primary concern of the individual during
the loan application is the acquisition of financing. This means that the offer of crop
insurance is secondary, or not present at all, in the minds of control group individuals,
whereas in the separate sale group, individuals have already been approved, or denied,
their loan. The cognitive strain associated with being presented too much information in
the face of a decision is referred to as information overload (Eppler & Mengis, 2004).
The effects of information overload include stress, loss of control over information and
lower decision quality. These factors may lead some consumers to avoid making
financial decisions. As such, due to the mental bandwidth required to complete the loan
application, we would expect individuals in the control (bundled) group to remember less
about the product, and as a result perform worse on the survey. This review of
interventions designed to increase understanding and the broader review of decisionmaking under poverty lend support to our original hypotheses, and support the following
additional hypothesis:
H1: Offering the insurance separated from the loan will increase overall client
understanding of the product.
One additional question which we wished to explore, unrelated to the analysis of the
treatment, was regarding whether or not individuals who understood the product better
were more likely to purchase the insurance product. Past studies have offered mixed
results on whether or not an increased understanding of the product leads to higher takeup rates (Cole et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2016). However, as
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mentioned previously, clients often list a lack of product understanding as a reason for
not buying microinsurance (Giné & Yang, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2016). As such, we
formulate and test the following hypothesis:
H2: Individuals with a better understanding of the insurance product will be more
likely to purchase the insurance product.

2.3

Take-Up and Coverage Amounts

Both mandatory and voluntary bundling offer MFIs a number of potential benefits.
Bundling microcredit with insurance schemes can protect MFIs against client loan
defaults (Banerjee et al., 2014; Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, & Peppiatt, 2006) or death
(Kalra, 2010). Banerjee et al. (2014) also note that mandatory bundling of microfinance
products can combat the problem of adverse selection among clients. Additionally, the
strategy of bundling presents clear advantages in terms of reducing delivery costs and
increasing outreach for the MFI. Wuebker, Baumgarten, Schmidt-Gallas, and Koderisch
(2008) note that effective bundling can offer convenient, “one-stop-shop” options at a
reduced cost to the client due to the savings in delivery. Offering multiple financial
products to a fixed client base also provides multiple sources of revenue for institutions
facing high operating costs given the low average loan sizes (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, &
Morduch, 2009). This argument takes on additional weight in rural lending, where long
distances and difficult road access to client farms add to the cost of delivering services.
Evidence suggests that there can be negative consequences to making the insurance
purchase mandatory as part of the bundling process (Banerjee et al., 2014; Giné & Yang,
2009). Giné and Yang (2009) found that clients offered a loan bundled with a mandatory
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rainfall insurance product accepted the terms of the credit offer by 13 percentage points
less than those who were offered credit with no insurance attached. This is concerning in
that requiring the insurance discouraged individuals from using microfinance altogether.
Banerjee et al (2014) found that requiring the purchase of health insurance with a loan
decreased both loan renewal rates for existing clients and take-up rates of loans for new
clients in India. This switch to mandatory insurance was so unpopular among clients that
this policy was eventually abandoned by the MFI.
This prior research finds that potential clients react negatively to the mandatory bundling
of microfinance products, and our prior literature review regarding the association
between understanding the product and the decision to purchase insurance led us to
formulate the hypothesis that separating the insurance will lead to better understanding
and those who understand the product will be more likely to purchase the insurance
product. As such, we determine that separating the loan offer from the insurance offer in
a voluntary bundle will lead to an increase in client willingness to purchase the insurance
product. As such we formulate the following two hypotheses regarding insurance take-up
rates and coverage amounts:
H3: Offering the insurance separated from the loan will increase take-up rates.
H4: Offering the insurance separated from the loan will increase coverage
amounts.
Prior studies suggest that the mandatory bundling of microfinance products is beneficial
to MFIs, but potential clients are not always receptive to accepting the terms of these
packaged products. This study contributes to this growing literature by examining
whether separating the insurance offer from the loan application process affects take-up,
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amount of insurance purchased, and product understanding when the purchase of
insurance is not necessary for obtaining the loan. By understanding the effect of the
timing of the insurance offer in relation to the loan application we can gain insight into
the barriers to consumer demand for the insurance product.
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CHAPTER 3. INSURANCE PRODUCT AND STUDY DESIGN

3.1

Background and Product Design

The randomized field experiment was conducted in partnership with Crezcamos, an MFI
based in Bucaramanga, Colombia. Crezcamos serves over 70,000 clients with individual
small business and agricultural loans. Almost two thirds of their clients live in rural areas,
many in remote mountainous locations. Most of the sample individuals’ loans (89
percent) have terms of 12 to 24 months. In addition to loans, Crezcamos offers several
insurance products. First, all Crezcamos borrowers are required to purchase a mandatory
credit life policy, which pays a benefit to Crezcamos if the borrower dies before the loan
is fully repaid. Second, Crezcamos also offers a number of voluntary insurance products
to its clients, including life insurance, property insurance covering the home and/or
business, and vehicle insurance. These products are offered as a bundle with the loan, and
almost all clients purchase them.
The research we conducted took place in the departments of Santander, North Santander,
and Cesar, a geographically diverse and agriculturally productive region in Colombia,
South America. The region has a variety of microclimates and weather patterns that place
farmers at risk to reduced yields and/or damaged plants. The region is also characterized
by a highly competitive credit market; the small towns in which Crezcamos branches are
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located are typically home to ten or more lenders, with clients frequently borrowing from
multiple lenders. We included clients from nine Crezcamos branch offices in the research
sample. A wide range of crops are grown in the region, including both permanent crops
such as coffee, cocoa and citrus, as well as transitory crops, such as potatoes, rice and
corn. Permanent crops are crops that do not require replanting between harvests while
transitory crops require replanting after each harvest.
The crop insurance product examined in this study is underwritten by the insurer
MAPRE. It was introduced by Crezcamos to clients in two of its branches in 2014, and in
seven more branches as part of the study in 2015. The product is designed for smallholder
farmers in Colombia, and is subsidized by the Colombian government. It covers losses
from seven weather-related perils: drought, excessive rain, hail, frost, flooding,
avalanches and landslides. The product is designed to offer coverage against natural
disasters, not to cover all possible risks to the farmer. For example, it does not cover crop
failures or losses due to pests or diseases. Additionally, it does not protect the farmer
against any loss associated with a drop in the market price of their crop, or issues
regarding storage or transportation of the crop after harvest.
Many, but not all, of the popular crops in the region, such as coffee, cocoa, and citrus
trees are eligible for coverage. However, other common crops grown in the region, such
as tomatoes, carrots, and pineapples, cannot be protected by the product. Livestock also
cannot be covered by this product. Both loan applicants of Crezcamos and nonborrowers, including those denied a loan, are eligible for the product. Each policy covers
only one crop; clients may purchase separate policies for multiple crops, although this
rarely happens in practice.
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Key elements of the insurance product differ for various crops, based on whether the crop
is permanent or transitory. For permanent crops, the insurance covers the farmer’s plants
for one calendar year from the time of purchase. The permanent crop coverage pays out
only if the weather related event permanently damages the farmer’s plant, not necessarily
if yields are low for a single harvest, but the plant will recover and produce the following
year. By contrast, the insurance for transitory crops covers the crop yield, but only
through the next harvest, not for the entire calendar year. As such, for producers of
permanent crops the insurance provides a benefit for a longer period of time. Transitory
crop farmers who purchase the insurance earlier in the growing cycle also enjoy the
benefit of a longer period of coverage when compared to transitory crop farmers who
purchase towards the end of the crop cycle.
Total premiums are based on a rate of three to eight percent of the insured amount,
depending on the crop. The government subsidizes 60 to 80 percent of that premium
amount, depending on the crop, the farm size, and whether clients qualify as a “small
farmer,” a qualification that nearly all Crezcamos clients achieve. In general, the rate is
higher for individuals who choose to cover transitory crops as opposed to permanent
crops. Clients can purchase a maximum amount of coverage per hectare depending on the
crop covered. These maximums vary from a low of $350/hectare to a high of
$6,667/hectare. On average, clients pay a rate of about $1 for every $100 of coverage
after the government subsidy (further discussed later).

17
3.2

Study Design

To measure the causal effect of separating a bundled microfinance product, we offered a
crop microinsurance product in both bundled and separated ways. Individuals applying
for a loan from Crezcamos were randomly assigned to be offered the new crop
microinsurance product either immediately following the loan application (control), or at
a later date after the loan application had been finalized (treatment). Traditionally,
Crezcamos had offered the crop microinsurance concurrently with the loan application, in
a bundled way. The loan approval process includes a visit to each applicant’s farm,
during which the loan officer completes extensive documentation, including a risk
assessment, and offers additional insurance products to the applicant.
By randomly assigning individuals drawn from the same pool of loan applicants to either
the control or treatment groups, we ensure that those who experience the two different
types of insurance offers are identical in expectation in terms of both socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics. In addition, the logistics of the randomization, detailed
below, enabled a de facto stratification by loan officer, since the randomization happened
on each loan officer’s smartphone with a 50 percent chance of the client being assigned
to either group. This design choice implies that our separation of credit and insurance is
not as complete as it could be; in our setup, all products are offered by the same agent
(the loan officer) of the same organization (Crezcamos). Our results therefore may not
extend to a situation where an MFI and a separate insurance company each offer their
own product to the same potential client base. Operationalizing the treatment as a timeseparation of the insurance offer from the loan offer but keeping both “in-house” allows
us to eliminate the influences of other factors on the demand for microinsurance, such as

18
trust and salesmanship of the loan officer, and narrow our focus on the joining or
separation of the two offers which is at the heart of the bundled approach.
The random assignment of farmers to treatment (separate offer) or control (bundled offer)
groups took place in the field with the use of a smartphone app. All loan officers are
provided with a smartphone by Crezcamos for calling clients or their manager. The
randomization app was loaded on the phone and used as part of the loan application
process to determine whether to offer the crop insurance during that visit (bundled) or
separately. In effect, the use of the phone app in the field stratified our randomization by
loan officer, ensuring that all loan officers managed loan applicants assigned to both
treatment and control groups. Individuals assigned to the control group were offered the
crop insurance immediately after the loan application process (and after other insurance
products had been offered). For individuals assigned to the treatment condition, the loan
officers met with them again approximately three weeks following the decision to
approve or deny the loan, and offered the insurance at that time.1 Table 3 reports the
averages of client and loan characteristics. The profile of individuals assigned to the
treatment and control groups are very similar, and none of the differences are statistically
significant. In addition, an F test of the joint significance of all the variables listed in
Table 3 in a regression where the treatment assignment is the dependent variable returns a
value of 1.19 (p=0.292), showing that the randomization was successful.
Our intervention included developing a standardized sales protocol and new sales tools,
in collaboration with Crezcamos. The protocol included a precise script that loan officers

1

Individuals whose loan application was denied were offered the crop insurance product, although none of
them decided to purchase it.
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used to describe the product, an explanatory video and current client testimonial that they
showed loan applicants on their company-provided smartphone, as well as prepared
answers to common questions. The protocol served two purposes. First, the protocol and
associated tools supported loan officers in selling a complex new product both effectively
and responsibly. One particular point of emphasis was to ensure that the clients
understood that purchase of the crop insurance product was entirely voluntary, and would
not have any effect on whether or not they would be approved for the loan. Additionally,
we also wanted to ensure that loan officers were not pressuring individuals into
purchasing the insurance product. Only a small proportion, 3.8 percent, of surveyed
individuals reported in a follow-up survey that they felt pressured to purchase the
insurance. Second, standardization helped to ensure loan officers took a consistent
approach to each sale, allowing us to isolate the effect of our intervention.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

4.1

Data Sources

We relied on four sources of quantitative data. The first was data on the random
assignment from the smartphone app. This included descriptive data, such as client name,
loan officer name, client identification number, and whether the client was assigned to
the treatment or the control group. The second was administrative data from Crezcamos
on all loan applicants and loans disbursed during the study. This data includes
demographic information, information about the client’s farm and other economic
activities, loan amount and loan term. Third, we use records of which clients purchased
the crop insurance product from the underwriting insurer. For those who purchased the
insurance, this data also provides details of the amount of coverage purchased and
premium paid. Finally, we conducted a short telephone survey of clients to measure their
understanding and recall of the insurance product. We focus on measures of (i) whether
the client understood that the insurance was voluntary, and wouldn’t affect loan approval
(ii) whether the client reported purchasing the crop insurance product, (iii) whether the
client knew the perils covered by the product, and (iv) whether the client felt pressured by
the loan officer to purchase the insurance.
During our study period of March 10 to October 31 of 2015, the randomizing app was
used 426 times. Of the 426 total uses of the randomizing app, 58 were dropped from the
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analyses, for reasons detailed below, so that our analysis sample includes 368 loan
applicants who were assigned to either the treatment or the control group. First, 16 clients
were mistakenly visited twice; in all analyses we consider the earlier assignment, and the
second app use was removed. Second, we removed 16 app uses that did not match with a
loan application in the lender’s database; these individuals approached loan officers about
a loan, and were processed in the app, but decided not to continue their loan application
for various reasons. Lastly, we removed 26 app uses for individuals who did not cultivate
an insurable crop and were not eligible for the insurance. For these clients, the app should
not have been used by the loan officer.
Of the 368 individuals in our analysis sample, 154 responded to the phone survey, for a
response rate of 42 percent. About 40 percent of the individuals who did not answer the
survey refused to participate, while we were unable to contact the remaining 60 percent
after multiple attempts. Quality control calls, to which our short survey was very similar,
are common in Colombia, which explains why some individuals refused to participate in
the survey. Table 2 presents data on survey respondents and non-respondents. It shows
that respondents were not significantly different from non-respondents in their
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Respondents were, however, more likely
to have purchased insurance than non-respondents (28 percent of respondents purchased
insurance, versus 19 percent of non-respondents). In addition, of those who purchased
insurance, survey respondents bought larger amounts of coverage and as such had higher
premiums than non-respondents. These differences inform our findings about the effect
of the treatment on knowledge and understanding of the product, but we cannot control
for them in our statistical analyses.
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4.2

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1, Panel A, shows detailed descriptive statistics on clients in our sample. On
average, individuals were 45 years old, were predominantly male (75 percent) and
married (68 percent).2 Almost all individuals had some form of formal education,
although rarely beyond the primary school level. The average number of economic
activities, defined as the number of sources of income, including different crops, was 2.4;
by drawing on various sources of income, households informally insure against risks to
any one source. Of the 368 individuals who applied for a loan, 329 were approved (89
percent). The average loan amount was US$1,268 and the average loan term was 20
months.
In regard to the insurance product, 84 individuals opted to purchase, for an overall takeup rate of 23 percent. The average amount of coverage was US$1,257, with a large range
(from US$167 to US$8,333). As mentioned before, the premium is subsidized at various
rates depending on the crop. The average total premium before subsidy was US$44,
ranging from US$5 to US$329 and the average total premium actually paid (after the
subsidy) was US$14, ranging from US$2 to US$129. This results in an average rate of
US$1 per US$100 of coverage.

2

For our analysis, we considered individuals who stated they were “married” and individuals who stated
they were “living with their partner” as married persons.
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS

5.1

Summary Statistics – Survey Measures

In addition to the information on demographics, loan characteristics, and insurance
purchase, we have telephone survey responses for 154 individuals. Details about survey
responses are listed in detail in Table 4, Panel B. Of the 154 respondents, 43 individuals
(28 percent) purchased insurance and 111 did not. 30 percent of individuals were
incorrect about whether or not they purchased insurance. Mostly these individuals stated
that they purchased insurance, when in fact they had not. This is troubling in that it
indicates that people were misinformed about their insurance status, the question was
poorly phrased, or survey participants were not providing reliable answers.
Of the survey respondents, 38 percent of individuals incorrectly reported that purchasing
the insurance product was required in order to get a loan. Crezcamos, along with many
other MFIs, mandates the purchase of credit-life insurance with loans, and this may have
contributed to the misunderstanding. Interestingly, however only 3.8 percent of survey
respondents stated that they felt pressure to purchase the crop insurance by the loan
officer. A majority of individuals (69 percent) either did not know the perils the insurance
product covered or incorrectly listed an event that they believed was covered by the
insurance product. Overall, knowledge was worse than expected, indicating the need to
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tailor products so they are easy to understand and maximize efforts to increase client
product understanding.

5.2

Bivariate Analyses

Because of the successful random assignment of individuals to treatment and control
groups, simple comparisons of means in the two groups reveal the causal effect of
separating the crop insurance offer from the loan application on the outcomes of interest.
We present such comparisons in Table 4, before turning to multivariate analyses in order
to increase the precision of our estimates and test their robustness.
Table 4 highlights three main findings. First, separating the offer of insurance from the
loan application process did not lead to an increase in take-up of the insurance. On the
contrary, the rate of insurance purchases was slightly higher in the bundled group (25
percent) than in the separate group (21 percent), although the difference is not statistically
significant.
Second, while take-up rates were statistically equivalent in the two groups, the data
provide suggestive evidence that separating the offer of insurance led to a decrease in the
amount of coverage purchased. Individuals in the separate group purchased a lower
average amount of coverage (US$951) than individuals in the bundled group (US$1,487).
This lower coverage amount also means that total premiums before the subsidy and the
premium the clients actually pay (after subsidy) are lower for the treatment group.
Third, and connected to the lack of effect on take-up, separating the insurance offer did
not significantly increase measures of understanding of the insurance product. In the
treatment group, 35 percent of individuals were incorrect about whether the insurance
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was required, compared to 40 percent in the control group (not statistically significant).
In regards to individuals incorrectly reporting whether or not they had purchased
insurance, 36 percent of separate (treatment) group individuals were wrong about this
question and only 25 percent were incorrect in the bundled (control) group, although
these differences are not statistically significant. The majority of individuals in both
groups were incorrect about the perils the product protected against, with 68 percent of
the treatment group getting this question incorrect compared to 69 of the control group
(not statistically significant). Finally, a small percentage of both groups reported that they
felt pressured by the loan officer to purchase the insurance product, with 4.8 percent of
the treatment group saying they felt pressure compared to 2.9 percent of the control group
(not statistically significant).
Overall, while the results do not point to clear, statistically significant differences in
product understanding between the two groups, the available evidence provides some
suggestion that separating the insurance offer led to lower understanding of the product,
contrary to our first hypothesis. More individuals in the treatment group were incorrect
about whether or not they actually purchased insurance. This finding that separating the
insurance offer from the loan does not lead to improved understanding can help to
alleviate the consumer protection concerns of practitioners and researchers who worry
that the voluntary bundling of microfinance products may have negative consequences
for MFI clients.
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5.3

Multivariate Analysis of Take-Up

Next, we ran a series of OLS regressions to determine if separating the insurance offer
led to a higher rate of insurance purchase. We implement the following regression model
to measure the intent-to-treat effect of our treatment on the take-up of insurance:
Y𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇i + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + δZi + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

where i indexes the individual loan applicants, Y is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual purchased crop insurance and 0 otherwise, T is a binary variable equal to 1 if
the individual was assigned to the treatment group and 0 if they were assigned to the
control group. X is a vector of controls including applicants’ number of economic
activities, number of dependents, age, gender, marital status, education status, home
ownership, loan amount, nature of the crop insured (permanent or transitory), and Z is a
series of binary variables for each Crezcamos loan officer who participated in the study
and for the month in which the app was used. We implement this model as linear
probability models rather than as probits because some loan officers processed very few
loan applications and did not sell any insurance policies. As such being assigned to one of
these loan officers would perfectly predict not purchasing insurance and the
corresponding observations would drop from the probit sample. We ran probit
regressions to test the robustness of our findings, and results are qualitatively similar to
the linear probability models (not shown). In all analyses, we cluster standard errors at
the branch level. The coefficient of interest is β.
In all of the regressions using the insurance purchase decision as the dependent variable,
all of the coefficients of interest are negative, but not statistically significant. This
provides evidence that separating the insurance offer from the loan application does not
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improve take-up rates, failing to support our Hypothesis 3. In column (1), we include
only the control variables for loan officer and app use month (Z) and then measure the
intent-to-treat effect. This analysis shows that being assigned to receiving the insurance
offer separately (treatment) from the loan application process was associated with a 7.4
percentage point decrease in the likelihood to purchase the insurance, although the
coefficients are not statistically significant.
In column (2) we include the additional control variables as specified in vector X in the
model above. These results show a similar, but still insignificant, result. Columns (3) and
(4) exclude individuals who do not cultivate a permanent crop, to see if there was a
treatment effect for only these individuals. We see similar results for those who only have
permanent crops, although again the treatment is not statistically significant.
In columns (2) and (4) when using the variable regarding loan amount, we denote
individuals who were denied a loan to have receive a loan amount of $US0.01, so that
they are not excluded from the regression and we can still take the log of loan amount for
the analysis. Without making this adjustment, we would lose individuals who were
denied a loan from the analysis, both reducing our total number of observations for the
regressions and causing us to not consider denied individuals in our analysis. It is worth
noting that no one who was denied a loan by Crezcamos purchased the crop insurance
product. Eliminating denied individuals from the analysis does not result in significant
differences between the take-up rates of the two groups.
In Table 6 we investigate the heterogeneity of our main result. We run our main
regression on sub-samples of the data according to loan size, gender, and age of the
borrower. For all sub-samples, take-up was lower in the treatment group than in the
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control group, but not statistically significantly so in any sub-sample. Columns (1) and
(2) separate individuals based on the size of their loan, using US$1,000, which is the
median loan amount, as the cutoff point. Columns (3) and (4) run the analysis separately
for men and women. Columns (5) and (6) separate individuals into young and old, based
on the median age (44) of individuals.
Our analysis of the insurance take-up rate found no significant effect of receiving the
offer separately on probability of insurance purchase. It is worth noting that while not
significant, the coefficients for the treatment were negative in all of the regressions. This
finding provides evidence against Hypothesis 3 and suggests that separating the insurance
sale from the loan application has no, or possibly a negative, effect on the decision to
purchase insurance when compared to a voluntary, bundled offering.

5.4

Extended Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis of Insurance Coverage

By performing a series of analyses regarding how the treatment affects the coverage
amount individuals elect to purchase, we find suggestive evidence that separating the
insurance offer from the loan actually decreases the amount of coverage people buy,
particularly for men, younger individuals, and individuals with large (greater than or
equal to US$1,000) loans. This strengthens the preliminary analysis using two-sided ttests which showed some indication that individuals who purchased insurance in the
bundled group bought higher amounts of coverage than the separate group, contradicting
Hypothesis 4. One limitation to this analysis is that there were only 84 individuals who
purchased insurance, and thus our sample size is much smaller than the previous analysis
of take-up rates. As such, we first conduct a series of t-tests, divided into subgroups, to
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examine the effect of the treatment on coverage amount. Detail from these tests can be
found in Table 7.
As mentioned previously, when examined overall, individuals in the treatment group
purchase a lower amount of coverage on average (US$951) than those in the control
group (US$1,487), a difference that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In
all of the subgroups, individuals in the control group (bundled) purchased more coverage
than individuals in the treatment (separated) group, although some subgroups exhibit
more stark contrasts than others. Individuals with large loans purchased an average of
US$1,685 of coverage if assigned to the control group and only US$1,010 if assigned to
the treatment. Men in the control group purchased US$1,757 dollars of coverage
compared to US$1,080 if in the treatment. Young individuals also purchased more
coverage if they were in the control group, with coverages amounts on average being
US$1,821 compared to US$946 if they were assigned to the treatment.
Since the overall difference in coverage is significant at the 10 percent level, we analyze
coverage within a regression framework. We use the same regression model described in
equation 1 above, but now use the amount of coverage as the dependent variable (Yi).
The results of the regression analysis suggest that being assigned to the treatment led to
lower amounts of coverage, although the coefficient of interest is not significant at the 5
percent level or below in any of the analyses. Since premiums are calculated based on
coverage amounts, this analysis also shows us that individuals in the treatment group
have lower premiums, both before and after the government subsidy. Detailed results of
our multivariate analysis of coverage amount can be found in Table 8.
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The coefficients on the treatment variable in columns (1) and (3) suggest that being
offered insurance separately from the loan application process had a negative effect on
the amount of coverage purchased by US$165 and US$246 for all crops and only
permanent crops, respectively. These regressions control for loan officer and the month
app was used (vector Z variables), but do not include the other control variables
described in vector X; in column (1) the sample includes all loan applications, in column
(3) the sample is restricted to applicants with a permanent crop. When the X vector
control variables are included the coefficients on the treatment indicator remain negative,
but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Columns (2) and (4) are for the full
sample and applicants with permanent crops only, respectively.
Based on the analysis of the coverage variable, there appears to be suggestive evidence
that individuals who received the treatment had significantly lower amounts of coverage
than individuals who did not. This contradicts Hypothesis 4, and lends evidence to
support the fact that separating the insurance product from the loan may lead to decreases
in coverage amounts.

5.5

Multivariate Analysis of Product Understanding

In terms of understanding of the product as measured by our survey, we expected the
separation of the insurance offer and loan application to increase understanding by
combatting the problem of information overload, and as a result of this, we hypothesized
that take-up rates and coverage amounts would increase. However, in the face of the
finding that the treatment did not improve take-up or coverage, we examine the survey
data to determine if the treatment improved measures of understanding independent of
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the take-up and coverage results, and find no support for our third hypothesis regarding
product understanding alone. We measured how accurately clients answered survey
questions to test understanding of the product across the two groups. Three of the four
survey measures were insignificant, and there is evidence that client knowledge about
whether or not they had purchased the insurance product was actually better in the
bundled (control) offering.
The previous multivariate analyses of both take-up rates and coverage amounts yielded
no evidence that separating the insurance sale from the loan application led to any
increase in take-up rates or coverage amounts. In regards to survey responses, we also
examined individuals answers to see if those in the treatment (separate) group had greater
knowledge of the product than those in the control (bundled) group. We focused on the
same four main variables as were mentioned in the bivariate analysis section regarding
survey answers for the analysis: (i) whether the client understood that the insurance was
voluntary, and wouldn’t affect loan approval (ii) whether the client reported purchasing
the crop insurance product, (iii) whether the client knew the perils covered by the
product, and (iv) whether the client felt pressured by the loan officer to purchase the
insurance. We used the same regression model as in the previous two analyses. The only
difference from the previous analysis is that now Yi is now a binary measure of each of
the four survey responses measured. For dependent variables (i) (ii) and (iii) specified
above, incorrect responses to these questions coded as 1 and correct answers were
recorded as 0. For dependent variable (iv), the response was coded as 1 if the individual
felt pressure to buy the insurance, and 0 if they reported they did not feel pressure.
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Detailed results of the multivariate analysis of the survey measures can be found in Table
9. Again, all results shown are OLS regressions, because probit regressions drop certain
observations for loan officers who only had a few uses of the app, and thus would
perfectly predict the binary outcome variables. Columns (1) and (2) show a regression of
the treatment on whether or not the individuals were incorrect about whether or not the
insurance purchase was required in order to get a loan (which it was not). In Column (1),
where there were control variables for both the loan officer and month the app was used
(vector Z). The coefficient is negative, meaning that individuals in the treatment group
were 9 percentage points less likely to state that the insurance was required, however, the
results for this question were not statistically significant. Column (2) also has controls for
the loan officer and month, but also includes the control variables in vector X. This
regression also shows a negative, but not statistically significant, relationship between the
treatment and respondents answers to whether or not the insurance purchase was
required.
Columns (3) and (4) use whether or not the individual was incorrect when they were
asked the question “Did you purchase the crop insurance product”. Surprisingly, 30
percent of survey respondents got this question wrong, and individuals in the treatment
(separate) group were more likely to get this question incorrect by 19.5 and 28.4
percentage points, respectively. The treatment coefficient in column (3) is significant at
the 10 percent level, while the treatment is significant at the 1 percent level in column (4).
This finding is contrary to our Hypothesis 1, and provides evidence that individuals in the
bundled (control) group actually recall their ownership status of the insurance product
better than individuals in the separate (treatment) group.
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Columns (5) and (6) use individuals being incorrect about the perils the product covers as
the dependent variable. The results from these analyses show that individuals in the
treatment group are slightly less likely to be incorrect about the perils covered by the
product, although these figures are not statistically significant. Columns (7) and (8) use
the individuals feeling pressured to purchase the product from the loan officer as the
dependent variable. While this is not directly a question about knowledge of the
insurance product, it is important from a consumer protection standpoint. If an individual
felt more pressure to purchase in one of the two scenarios, that would be a major
consideration. Being assigned to the treatment group increased the likelihood individuals
reported being pressured into buying the insurance by 5.5 and 6.9 percentage points,
respectively, in columns (7) and (8). However, the effect of the treatment was not
statistically significant.
While the direction of the association is mixed for our four different measures of
understanding and pressure to purchase in this analysis, there is no evidence to support
the fact that separating the sale of the insurance product from the loan application
increases understanding, contrary to our Hypothesis 1. There is also suggestive evidence
that individuals assigned to the treatment group are worse at understanding whether or
not they purchased the insurance product.
In addition to our main focus on the effect of the treatment on take-up rates, coverage
amounts, and levels of understanding, our Hypothesis 2 aimed to ascertain whether
higher understanding of the product was associated with higher take-up rates. We found
evidence that individuals who understand the perils covered by the product and
individuals who knew whether or not they had bought the insurance product had higher
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take-up rates than individuals who were incorrect on these two survey measures, but we
found no association between understanding about the voluntary nature of the product
and take-up rates.
For this analysis, we compared survey respondents’ understanding of the product by
analyzing answers to the following questions: (i) whether the client understood that the
product was not required (i) whether the client reported purchasing the crop insurance
product and (ii) whether the client knew the perils covered by the product. To conduct
our analysis, we implement the following regression model:
Y𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Si + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + δZi + 𝜀𝑖

(2)

where i indexes the individual loan applicants, Y is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
individual purchased crop insurance and 0 otherwise, S is a binary variable equal to 1 if
the individual was correct for the survey question being analyzed and 0 if they were not.
X and Z are the same vector of variables as described in the previous regression analyses.
A detailed breakdown of this analysis can be found in Table 10.
Looking first at the regression analyzing whether or not clients understood that the
product was not required, we see that individuals who incorrectly answered this question
were not statistically more or less likely to purchase the product. However, in examining
the next column we see that individuals who were correct about their insurance purchase
status had significantly higher take-up rates than individuals who were incorrect (an
increase of 32 percentage points). This is due to the fact that most individuals who
answered this survey question incorrectly stated that they purchased insurance, when they
in fact had not purchased insurance and very few individuals who purchased the product
incorrectly stated they had not purchased. Of surveyed individuals who did not buy the
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insurance product, 40 percent incorrectly stated that they had purchased insurance, while
only 5 percent of individuals who purchased the product incorrectly stated they had not
purchased.
Another measure we examined was individuals recall of whether or not understanding the
perils covered by the product increased the likelihood of purchase. As we can see,
individuals who understood which perils were covered by the product correctly had takeup rates 24.5 percentage points higher than those who got the survey question wrong, and
this result is statistically significant.
Of the three survey variables we analyzed to determine if understanding was associated
with an increased likelihood of insurance purchase, two returned positive, significant
results. This provides evidence that individuals who understand certain features of the
product better are more likely to purchase the product, and supports our Hypothesis 2.
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We investigate the effect of separating a voluntary bundle of credit and insurance on the
demand for and understanding of insurance products. Applicants for agricultural
microcredit loans in Colombia were randomly assigned to be offered voluntary crop
microinsurance either together with their loan application, or a later date. While bundling
can help MFIs and insurers expand outreach and lower costs and prices, it may also
confuse borrowers who are focused on their loan application, and lead to lower take-up.
Our results show that bundling financial products for low-income individuals in
developing countries, in a voluntary manner, is a valid strategy for increasing financial
access at the lowest cost. Individuals offered a loan and a crop microinsurance product in
a bundled manner did not exhibit lower levels of understanding of the product, and were
not less likely to choose to purchase the insurance. On the contrary, we found suggestive
evidence that bundling led to better understanding of the insurance and higher coverage
purchased. Additionally, in our analysis of how understanding of the survey affected
take-up rates, we found some evidence that those who understood the product better were
more likely to purchase insurance.
Our work suffers from two main limitations. First, we do not consider the actuarial value
and relevance of the product to participants, either real or perceived. The research design
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is internally valid regardless of product characteristics, but such characteristics do
influence potential clients’ decision to purchase as well as the broad understanding of the
research results. The cost of the insurance (the average rate actually paid was $1 for every
$100 of coverage) suggests that the insurance would be actuarially fair for clients
exposed to losses with a probability of happening during the policy period equal to or
greater than 1 percent. While we are aware of no research that provides probabilities of
small-scale farmers in mountainous Colombia experiencing losses from one or more of
the event(s) covered by this product, Colombia was ranked as one of the 20 countries
most vulnerable to extreme weather risks as a result of climate change (Wheeler, 2011).
In addition, Dietrich and Ibanez (2015) found that more than 80 percent of tobacco
farmers in the same department of Colombia where this research was conducted,
Santander, reported a shock in 2009-2010, which were mainly weather related in nature.
Beyond the question of actuarial fairness, we do not know whether the product actually
helps its customers manage (and ideally reduce) the risks that they face. Further research
on the portfolio of risk management tools that small holder farmers use could provide
such evidence.
Second, separating the offer of crop insurance from the loan application process has two
implications for the potential client. The client receives the insurance offer at a separate
time from the loan application and additionally, the client is not able to finance their
insurance premiums with their loan payments, and individuals in the bundled group were.
This means that individuals in the separate sale group must pay for the insurance upfront,
while individuals in the bundled group can pay for their insurance in increments as they
make their loan payments. Our experiment does not measure both of these differences
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individually. However, since our treatment was designed to measure the effect of
separating the insurance offer from the voluntary bundle, it is appropriate that we did not
isolate these effects individually, as both the timing of the offer and financing differences
are aspects of the bundling process. Future research could aim to test individually how
changing the timing or altering the ability of clients to finance their premiums affects
microinsurance take-up.
Despite these limitations, our work highlights the need for strong consumer protection
measures in microinsurance. Understanding of the insurance product was low in both
bundled and separate offer groups, suggesting that information and consumer protection
around the offer of insurance products is key. Failing to understand basic elements of the
product will prevent clients from utilizing the insurance effectively and may cause
disappointment. When clients do not know they have coverage, they may fail to make a
claim in the event of a loss unless reminded. If they do not understand the policy terms or
have unrealistic expectations of the payout, they may experience an unintentional lapse in
coverage or have misconceptions about how they will manage their finances in the event
of a loss. Our finding that individuals had low overall knowledge of the product
highlights the necessity for MFIs and other providers of microinsurance to improve
efforts to make products understandable and ensure ongoing access to information to
clients and potential clients.
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Table 1 – Descriptive and Summary Statistics
N

Mean

Median

Standard dev.

Panel A – Client characteristics
1 if assigned to separate sale (treatment)

368

46.7

0

0.5

# of economic activities

368

2.4

2

1.044

# of children

359

2.9

3

2.166

# of economic dependents

359

1.1

1

1.393

Age

359

45

44

13

% female

368

25.3

0

0.435

% married

359

67.7

1

0.468

% with any formal education

358

92.7

1

0.26

% own home

368

69.8

1

0.46

Panel B – Loan and insurance characteristics
Purchased insurance

368

22.8

0

0.42

Loan term (months)

368

20.1

24

6.9

Loan amount (USD)

325

1,267

1,000

904

Insurance coverage purchased (USD)

84

1,257

666

1412

Total premium (USD, before subsidy)

84

43.65

19.95

58.56

Premium actually paid (USD)

84

13.51

7.48

19.2

Insurance rate (per $100 of coverage)

84

1.01

0.75

0.579

Percent of max coverage

83

25.1

16.7

25.6

Note. The sample includes 368 individuals offered insurance, 84 of whom chose to purchase.
Percent of max coverage is calculated by dividing the maximum amount of coverage the client was
eligible to purchase by the amount of coverage they actually purchased. The insurance rate is the
average amount paid, after the government subsidy, for US$100 of insurance coverage.

40
Table 2 – Differences in Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Individuals
N

All

% assigned to the treatment group

368

46.7

Not
Surveyed
48.1

# of Economic Activities

368

2.4

# of children

359

2.9

# of dependents

359

1.1

Age

359

45

% female

368

25.3

% married

359

67.7

% any formal education

358

92.7

% homeowners

368

69.8

Loan term (months)

368

20.1

Loan amount (USD)

325

1,268

Coverage (USD)

84

1,257

Total premium (USD)

84

43.7

Premium paid (USD)

84

13.5

Insurance rate (per $100 of coverage)

84

Percent of max coverage

83

Insured

368

Surveyed

P-Value

44.8

0.529

2.4

2.4

0.736

2.8

3.0

0.609

1.1

1.1

0.984

44

46

0.101

25.2

25.3

0.984

67.1

68.5

0.794

92.3

93.3

0.735

68.7

71.4

0.574

19.7

20.6

0.185

1,227

1,320

0.358

933

1,567

0.039

30.5

56.2

0.044

9.4

17.4

0.056

1.01

0.96

1.07

0.385

25.1

20.8

29.1

0.140

22.8

19.2

27.9

0.048
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Table 3 – Randomization Check – Bundled Vs. Separate Characteristics
N

Total

Bundled

Separate

P-Value

# of economic activities

368

2.4

2.4

2.3

0.422

# of children

359

2.9

2.8

3.0

0.643

# economic dependents

359

1.1

1.2

1.0

0.114

Age

359

44.6

43.9

45.4

0.275

% female

368

25.3

28.6

21.5

0.121

% married

359

67.7

68.8

66.5

0.641

% any formal education

358

92.7

94.1

91.2

0.280

1 if own home

368

69.8

68.9

70.9

0.670

Loan amount (USD)

325

1,268

1,314

1,217

0.335

Loan term (months)

368

20.1

20.4

19.7

0.364

Permanent crop (%)

368

86.1

84.7

87.8

0.417

84
84
84
84
84
83
152
154
154

Insurance coverage purchased (USD)

Insurance coverage purchased / loan amount

Total premium (before subsidy)

Premium actually paid

Insurance rate (per $100 of coverage)

Percent of max coverage

Wrong about insurance required

Wrong about whether they had insurance

Wrong about the perils the insurance product protects against

68.8

29.9

37.5

25.1

1.01

13.51

43.65

1.10

1,257

22.8

Total

69.4

24.7

39.8

26.9

1.09

16.98

55.02

1.21

1,487

24.5

Bundled

68.1

36.2

34.8

22.8

0.91

8.88

28.48

0.95

951

20.9

Separate

0.864

0.122

0.531

0.471

0.173

0.055

0.039

0.316

0.085

0.418

P-Value

Felt pressure to buy the insurance
131
3.8
2.9
4.8
0.566
Note. The insurance rate is the amount an individual paid for $100 of insurance coverage. While this amount looks
slightly larger for the control group, this is due to the fact that individuals who insure transitory crops pay a higher
insurance rate than those who insure permanent crops. Very few individuals (4 of the 84 purchasers) who purchased
insurance did so for transitory crops, and all of them were in the control group. These 4 individuals had an average
rate of $3.11, while purchasers of permanent crops had a rate of $0.91. Consequently, if you examined the rates of
only permanent crop purchasers and compared them across the control and treatment groups, you would find the
average rate for both groups to be $0.91. Percent of max coverage is representative of how much insurance
individuals purchased as a percentage of how much they could have purchased, calculated by dividing the amount
of coverage they purchased by the maximum amount they were allowed to purchase.

368

1 if bought insurance

N

Table 4 – Outcome Variables Separated by Treatment
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Table 5 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on take-up rates

treat

(1)
All Crops

(2)
All Crops

(3)
Perm Crops

(4)
Perm Crops

-0.074
(0.088)

-0.076
(0.093)
0.057
(0.071)
0.004
(0.011)
-0.020*
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.073
(0.056)
0.032
(0.061)
0.043
(0.058)
-0.005
(0.036)
0.035*
(0.015)
0.008
(0.124)

-0.078
(0.094)

-0.081
(0.096)

0.222
(0.166)

0.016
(0.016)
-0.014
(0.012)
0.000
(0.001)
0.085
(0.059)
0.005
(0.060)
0.068
(0.054)
0.001
(0.042)
0.035*
(0.017)
-0.024
(0.225)

1 if permanent crop
# of economic activities
# of dependents
age
1 if female
1 if married
1 if any formal ed.
1 if own home
Ln(loan amount)
Constant

0.126
(0.203)

Observations
368
356
317
306
R-squared
0.389
0.424
0.383
0.416
Note. Standard errors clustered at the branch level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Includes control variables for loan officers and month of app use. All regressions are
OLS. Column (1) is an regression of insurance purchase on the treatment including controls
for each loan officer and the month in which the app was used. Column (2) is similar to (1) but
with additional control variables. Columns (3) and (4) are the same as (1) and (2), except that
Columns (1) and (2) use all of the crops for analysis while regressions (3) and (4) use only
permanent crops.
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Table 6 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on take-up rates, subgroups

treat

(1)
Small
Loan

(2)
Large
Loan

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Men

Women

Young

Old

-0.043
(0.082)

-0.104
(0.081)

-0.064
(0.065)

-0.010
(0.153)

-0.089
(0.078)

-0.101
(0.121)

Observations
163
201
275
93
186
173
R-squared
0.437
0.467
0.372
0.589
0.462
0.432
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Includes control variables for loan officer and month of app use. All of
the above regressions are OLS.
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Table 7 – Coverage Amounts separated by treatment, with subgroups
Overall

N
84

All
1,257

Control
1,487

Treatment
951

P-Value
0.085

Small
Large

31
53

1,048
1,380

1,184
1,685

833
1,010

0.429
0.111

Men
Women

56
28

1,443
887

1,757
1,037

1,080
617

0.102
0.313

Young
46
1,498
1,821
946
0.109
Old
38
967
977
956
0.925
Note. Data in the all, control, and treatment group columns are
averages, for the entire sample of insurance buyers (first line) and for
various subgroups. All averages are denominated in USD.
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Table 8 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on coverage amount

treat

(1)
All Crops

(2)
All Crops

(3)
Perm Crops

(4)
Perm Crops

-165.278
(264.060)

-245.971
(290.553)

-174.244*
(78.797)

879.179
(501.839)

-168.956
(94.970)
1,726.561***
(125.843)
-181.398*
(79.256)
-323.449***
(37.041)
-4.765
(4.097)
-140.082*
(71.348)
143.773
(315.967)
-69.971
(273.790)
195.445
(119.061)
575.978**
(224.872)
2,010.993**
(663.837)

5,158.382***
(279.046)

-172.082*
(80.021)
-325.566***
(37.974)
-2.827
(3.693)
-135.119
(79.569)
159.379
(313.655)
-64.851
(328.911)
176.762
(121.787)
549.774*
(235.499)
429.229
(389.794)

84
0.640

84
0.741

80
0.651

80
0.734

1 if permanent crop
# of economic activities
# of dependents
age
1 if female
1 if married
1 if any formal ed.
1 if own home
Ln(loan amount)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Includes control variables for loan officers and month of app use. All of the above regressions are OLS.
Columns (1) and (2) include all crops, with additional control variables as listed in column (2). Columns
(3) and (4) are for permanent crops only.

152
0.341

-0.090
(0.109)

-0.055
(0.125)
0.228
(0.147)
-0.064
(0.037)
0.048
(0.030)
0.008*
(0.004)
0.072
(0.097)
0.214**
(0.089)
-0.174
(0.242)
-0.070
(0.106)
-0.004
(0.045)
147
0.456

(2)
Required

154
0.403

0.195*
(0.104)

(3)
Bought
0.284***
(0.076)
0.069
(0.079)
-0.079**
(0.026)
-0.009
(0.027)
0.001
(0.004)
0.135
(0.135)
-0.031
(0.070)
-0.247*
(0.126)
0.014
(0.048)
0.013
(0.062)
149
0.465

(4)
Bought

154
0.225

-0.005
(0.038)

(5)
Perils
-0.010
(0.068)
0.154
(0.100)
-0.019
(0.048)
0.058*
(0.028)
0.002
(0.005)
-0.077
(0.162)
-0.015
(0.086)
0.320
(0.301)
-0.014
(0.105)
0.039
(0.035)
149
0.283

(6)
Perils

131
0.226

0.055
(0.038)

(7)
Pressure

0.069
(0.057)
-0.054
(0.173)
0.025
(0.030)
-0.010
(0.017)
0.002
(0.002)
0.061
(0.101)
-0.009
(0.028)
0.084
(0.067)
-0.004
(0.057)
0.021
(0.025)
128
0.291

(8)
Pressure

Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) use individual was wrong about
whether or not insurance was required to get a loan as dependent variable. (3) and (4) use individuals was wrong about whether or not they purchased the
insurance product. (5) and (6) use incorrect about the perils covered by the product. (7) and (8) use felt pressure to buy the insurance product. Control
variables for loan officers and month app were included in all regressions, not shown. Control variables as specified by vector X included in even
numbered columns only.

Observations
R-squared

Ln(loan amount)

1 if own home

1 if any formal ed.

1 if married

1 if female

age

# of dependents

# of economic activities

1 if permanent crop

treat

(1)
Required

Table 9 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on knowledge of the product
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Table 10 – Insurance Take-Up by Correct Survey Answers
(1)
Required
Correct about
Insurance Required

(2)
Bought

-0.020
(0.073)

Insurance Purchased

0.323***
(0.067)

Perils Covered
1 if permanent crop
# of economic activities
# of dependents
age
1 if female
1 if married
1 if any formal ed
1 if own home
Ln(loan amount)
Constant

(3)
Perils

0.113
(0.116)
0.007
(0.064)
-0.013
(0.029)
0.002
(0.003)
0.218
(0.177)
0.004
(0.109)
0.132**
(0.057)
0.008
(0.041)
0.057*
(0.027)
-0.725**
(0.259)

0.122
(0.107)
-0.019
(0.058)
-0.018
(0.030)
0.002
(0.003)
0.235
(0.134)
0.010
(0.102)
0.045
(0.079)
0.013
(0.042)
0.053***
(0.013)
-0.904***
(0.261)

0.245***
(0.058)
0.165
(0.103)
-0.001
(0.053)
0.002
(0.023)
0.003
(0.002)
0.196
(0.162)
-0.004
(0.101)
0.178
(0.112)
-0.005
(0.037)
0.069*
(0.031)
-1.007***
(0.249)

Observations
147
149
149
R-squared
0.511
0.572
0.554
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is insurance
take-up rate.
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